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Reform of the Divorce Provisions of the Marriage 
Contract 
Allen M. Parkman* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
When marriage was a life long commitment for most 
couples, the divorce statutes were of minor concern. 1 However, 
this situation changed during the Twentieth Century as the 
divorce rate rose dramatically.2 Courts became more willing to 
accept perjured testimony to establish the fault grounds of 
adultery, desertion and cruelty. Those grounds were eventually 
replaced by no-fault divorce statutes. Between 1969 and 1985, 
all of the states passed no-fault divorce statutes that either 
made incompatibility or irretrievable breakdown the only 
grounds for divorce or added these grounds to the existing fault 
grounds. The change in the grounds for divorce from fault 
based to no-fault based has had broader ramifications than 
were anticipated.3 Often, no-fault divorce shifted the basis for 
the dissolution of marriages from negotiated settlements based 
on mutual consent, to termination at will by either party 
* Regents' Professor of Management, University of New Mexico. B.A., Brown 
University, 1962; Ph.D., University of California, Los Angeles, 1973; J.D., 
University of New Mexico, 1979. This paper benefitted from the comments of 
Margaret Brinig. This research was funded by a summer research grant from the 
Robert 0. Anderson School of Management Foundation. 
1 For example, in England between 1800 and 1850 there were fewer than 
two divorces per year. Griselda Rowntree & Norman H. Carrier, The Resort to 
Divorce in England and Wales, 1858-1957, 11 POPULATION STUD. 188 (1958). 
2 The divorce rate increased during most of the 20th Century. It rose from 
less than 1.0 per 1,000 population at the turn of the century to 2.2 in 1960, 
increasing rapidly to 5.2 in 1980. Since then, it has fallen back to 4.7 in 1989. 
U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF 
THE UNITED STATES (1975); U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP"r OF 
COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1991, at 62 (lllth ed. 
1991). 
::l 8Pe generally ALLEN M. PARKMAN, No-FAULT DIVORCE: WHAT WENT 
WRONG? (1992). 
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subject to legally prescribed financial and custodial 
arrangements. 
The initially positive response to the new grounds for 
divorce has been muted as the negative repercussions of the 
new grounds have been recognized. The most visible impact 
has been a deterioration in the financial condition of divorced 
women and their children.4 A more subtle impact has been a 
reduction in the quality of life for many women and their 
families because no-fault divorce reduced the incentives for 
spouses to increase their specialization during marriage. 5 
While the circumstances faced by divorced women and their 
children have been the basis of much consternation, the courts 
and legislatures have not developed a systematic program of 
reform. Few people advocate the reintroduction of fault-based 
divorce, but the other solutions that have been offered for 
improving the welfare of divorced women and their children 
have often been ad hoc. The courts and legislatures have 
attempted to help divorced women by awarding them interests 
in their husbands' degrees, licenses, and professional goodwill;6 
and by compensating them for having been housewives and 
mothers. 7 
The fault grounds for divorce essentially required the 
innocent spouse to be the plaintiff so that it was almost 
impossible for spouses who wanted a divorce to win a contested 
lawsuit. Usually, the divorce resulted from a negotiated 
settlement that left both parties in a better position than if 
they had remained married. On the other hand, no-fault 
divorce reduced the negotiating power of the party who did not 
want a divorce by shifting the outcome to the legally prescribed 
financial and custodial obligations. These obligations, which are 
similar to contract damages, underestimate the cost of divorce 
to many divorced spouses and their children. Under the no-
fault system, a divorce can often occur when the net benefits 
4 This trend was documented in LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE 
REVOLUTION 323 (1985); see also H. Elizabeth Peters, Marriage and Divorce: 
Informational Constraints and Private Contractmf?, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 437 (1986). 
Because women tend to be more adversely affected by divorce, this article assumes 
for simplicity that the person asking for a divorce, the divorcing spouse, is the 
husband and the other party, the divorced spouse, is the wife. 
5 PARKMAN, supra note 3, at 100. 
6 Allen M. Parkman, The Recognition of Human Capital as Property in 
Divorce Settlements, 40 ARK. L. REV. 439, 459-66 ( 1987). 
7 Joan M. Krauskopf, Theories of PropPrty Division/Spousal Support: 
Searchinf? for Solutions to the Mystery, 2::! FAM. L.Q. 2fi::!, 263 (1989). 
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are negative. The laws that controlled the financial and 
custodial arrangements at divorce had not been subjected to 
scrutiny during the fault era because most divorces with 
substantial assets were negotiated rather than litigated. 
The contention of this paper is that the no-fault divorce 
laws tend to produce undesirable outcomes because divorcing 
spouses are not confronted with the true costs of divorce. Social 
welfare would be improved by a more systematic approach to 
the divorce arrangements if based on principles from contract 
law.8 While the recent change in the divorce laws has altered 
the grounds for divorce, the change can also be viewed as a 
shift from a marriage contract for the joint lives of the parties 
with specific performance the remedy for a breach, to a contract 
terminable at will subject to liquidated damages generally 
prescribed by statute. 
Section II of this paper discusses the shift from fault to no-
fault divorce. Section III addresses whether it is appropriate to 
view marriage as a contract. Then, section IV analyzes the 
remedies for a contract breach-damages and specific 
performance. Economic analysis is used to identify the 
circumstances under which these remedies should be applied. 
Finally, section V uses the above analysis to argue that social 
welfare would be improved by a presumption that marriage is 
for the joint lives of the parties, with the remedy for a breach 
being specific performance. A marriage could be dissolved at 
will subject to damages when the potential costs of divorce are 
likely to be low and predictable as they tend to be early in a 
marriage and when there are no children. 
II. THE SHIFT FROM FAULT TO NO-FAULT DIVORCE 
For most of the history of the United States, 
divorce-when permitted-was based on fault. One spouse was 
required to prove that the other spouse was responsible for the 
failure of the marriage based on grounds such as adultery, 
8 For discussions of the reform of no.fault divorce based on contract 
principles, see generally June Carbone & Margaret F. Brinig, Rethinking Marriage: 
Feminist Ideology, Economic Change, and Divorce Reform, 65 TuL. L. REV. 953 
(1991); Ira M. Ellman, The Theory of Alimony, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1989); Marjorie 
M. Shultz, Contractual Ordering of Marriage: A New Model for State Policy, 70 
CAL. L. REV. 207 (1982); Jeffrey E. Stake, Mandatory Planning for Divorce, 45 
VAND. L. REV. 397 (1992). For a discussion of the reform of no-fault divorce based 
on tort principles, see generally Twila L. Perry, No-Fault Divorce and Liability 
Without Fault: Can Family Law Learn from 1brts?, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 55 (1991). 
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cruelty, or desertion. The legal grounds for divorce and the 
legal standards for ithe accompanying property division, 
alimony, child support and custody penalized the party who 
was at fault. As divorce became more common, the likelihood 
increased that the parties fabricated the evidence to establish 
fault. 9 Under those circumstances, the divorce was often based 
on mutual consent with the parties agreeing to their own 
financial and custodial arrangements. When both parties 
wanted a divorce, the couple agreed to a settlement and the 
evidence necessary to establish the grounds. Then, one party 
accepted the responsibility for the failure of the marriage. 
This process became more complicated, however, when only 
one party initially wanted a divorce, because the plaintiff in a 
divorce action had to be the "innocent party." The divorcing 
spouse had to have evidence of fault by her spouse or persuade 
him to be the plaintiff in the divorce case. The spouse who 
wanted the divorce usually had to make substantial 
concessions to the other party to obtain cooperation. The spouse 
who initially opposed the divorce was often the wife because of 
her increased specialization in household activities during 
marriage. 10 As a result, the concessions at divorce could be an 
increase in the property settlement, alimony, child support and 
even custody of the children. In reaching these agreements, the 
parties could essentially ignore the applicable laws. In a 
community property state, for example, wives were entitled by 
law to one-half of the property acquired by the couple during 
the marriage. Consequently, if the husband asked for a divorce, 
the wife could respond by demanding more than one-half of the 
community property. For the fabricated divorces under the 
fault standards, the mutual consent of each spouse was far 
more important than the fault-based grounds and the legal 
standards for the arrangements at divorce. In essence, each 
9 Donald Schiller, Note, Legislation Notes: Domestic Relations-A Survey of 
Mental Cruelty as a Ground for Divorce, 15 DEPAUL L. REV. 159, 163 (1965) (citing 
Neu v. Neu, 298 N.W. 318 (Mich. 1941) (parents fabricated evidence in divorce 
proceeding)). 
10 There often can be an asymmetry of the timing of the contributions of 
men and women to marriage. The contributions of the wife can occur earlier in the 
marriage than the contributions of the husband. For example, child rearing usually 
occurs early in the marriage, while the benefits from additional earnings generally 
occur later. This creates an incentive for the husband to divorce the wife later in 
the marriage. See generally Lloyd Cohen, Marriage, Divorce. and Quasi Rents; or, 'I 
Gave Him the Best Years of My Life.' 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 267 (19R7). 
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spouse had a right to specific performance of a continuation of 
the marriage that could be waived-for compensation. 11 
The introduction of no-fault divorce was a radical change 
in these procedures. 12 California adopted the first unequivocal 
no-fault divorce statute in 1969 when it established 
irreconcilable differences and incurable insanity as the only 
grounds for divorce. During the following sixteen years, the 
other forty-nine states, Puerto Rico and the District of 
Columbia passed statutes that either made incompatibility or 
irretrievable breakdown the only grounds for divorce or added 
them to the existing fault-based grounds. In most states, no-
fault divorce meant that a divorce could be obtained by just one 
spouse. 13 However, the divorce settlement continued to be 
subject to the outdated legal standards for determining 
property division, alimony, child support and custody. 
The shift from fault to no-fault divorce was commonly 
viewed as desirable, because the new laws removed the 
hypocritical fault-based grounds. However, no-fault divorce 
created its own frustrations due to the belated recognition of 
the power that the fault-based grounds gave the spouse who 
did not want a divorce. The no-fault grounds for divorce 
dramatically reduced the negotiating power of that person. The 
reduction in this negotiating power would be less important if 
neither party had altered their activities due to the marriage. 
However, that was usually not the case since marriage benefits 
from the increased specialization of the spouses. 14 This 
specialization can result in costs for at least one spouse if the 
marriage is dissolved. These costs are not accurately reflected 
in the legal arrangements required at divorce. 
11 Specific performance was a right to the continuation of the marriage. The 
courts would not normally become involved in the quality of the performance 
during the marriage. 
12 For data on the current status of the divorce laws, see generally Timothy 
B. Walker & Linda D. Elrod, Family Law in the Fifty States: An Overview, 26 
FAM. L.Q. 319 (1993). 
13 In a few states, mutual consent is required for a no-fault divorce. See 
DANIEL SITARZ, DIVORCE AND DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE LAWS OF THE UNITED 
STATES (1990). In New York, for example, the no-fault grounds consist of (1) living 
separate and apart for one year under the terms of a separation agreement which 
is in writing and signed and notarized or (2) living separate and apart for one 
year under the terms of a judicial separation decree. 
14 See, e.g., GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY (1981); FRANCINE 
D. BLAU & MARIANNE A. FERBER, THE ECONOMICS OF WOMEN, MEN, AND WORK 
36-41 (2d ed. 1992). 
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The impact of the shift from fault to no-fault divorce can be 
more clearly understood by examining the effect of a shift from 
specific performance to damages as the remedy for the breach 
of a contract. In the next section, the attributes of marriage 
that make it similar to a contract are discussed. 
III. THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT 
While the term, "contract," has sometimes been associated 
with marriage, activities before and during marriage 
traditionally have not been covered by contract law. Marriage 
is created by an agreement similar to a contract, but once 
solemnized it becomes a status controlled more by law than by 
the preferences of the parties. Marriage also has been described 
as a civil contract to subordinate the role of religious 
denominations in its formation. 15 Nevertheless, the agreement 
by two people to marry includes all the elements of a contract: 
offer, acceptance and consideration. The offer and acceptance 
are obvious. Both the law and the marriage vows impose 
obligations on both parties that meet the standards for 
consideration. 
Marriage also involves problems similar to those addressed 
by contract law. Contract law traditionally has served an 
important role in limiting two dangers when exchanges occur 
over time: opportunism and unforeseen contingencies. 16 A 
fundamental function of contract law is to deter people from 
behaving opportunistically to encourage long-term investments, 
for example, and to reduce the need for people to take costly 
steps to protect themselves. 17 The common law and recent 
statutes such as the Uniform Commercial Code deal with 
unforeseen contingencies by prescribing the elements of a 
commercial contract unless modified by the parties. 18 
The creation of the marriage agreement is similar to the 
requirements of a commercial contract, since the agreement 
must be voluntary and it can be annulled if the agreement of 
one party was obtained by fraud19 or force. 20 Also, the parties 
15 HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOME81'JG RELATIONS IN THE UNITED 
STATES (2d ed. 1987). 
16 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 79-126 (::ld ed. 1986). 
17 !d. 
18 E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 446 (1982). 
19 U.C.C. § 2-721 (1977). 
20 JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CONTitACTS ;~55 (:id ed. 1987). 
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must be competent based on age and mental capacity to make 
a socially acceptable choice.21 
Marriage is often viewed as a status rather than a contract 
because of the government's role in establishing the terms of 
the marriage agreement. However, government plays a major 
role in determining permissible parties and subjects for most 
other contracts. For example, child labor laws limit the parties 
who can enter into labor contracts on the basis of age22 and 
criminal laws limit the subject of contracts on the basis of 
health and public welfare. 23 Similar restrictions apply to 
marriage agreements. During most of the Christian era, 
marriage was an agreement that could not easily be dissolved 
or altered by the parties.24 Government regulations also limit 
the rights of parties to contract when third parties are affected, 
such as in zoning.25 The marriage laws have similar 
restrictions. For example, children are third party beneficiaries 
of a marriage agreement, so statutes define the parent's 
obligations to their children.26 These obligations formerly 
occurred only if the father and mother were married, but have 
been extended to parents who are not married.27 
In summary, because a marriage agreement is similar to 
other contracts, it is appropriate to consider the preferred 
duration of the marital contract and the remedies for a breach. 
Under fault-based divorce, each "innocent" party had a right to 
the continuation of the marriage similar to the right to specific 
performance under contract law.28 However, no-fault divorce 
permits a divorce at will, subject only to the financial and 
custodial arrangements required by law.29 This requirement is 
similar to the remedy of liquidated damages under contract 
law.30 Much literature has developed that discusses the 
attributes of specific performance and damages as alternate 
remedies for the breach of contracts. 31 
21 E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 213-14 (1982). 
22 See CAL. LAB. CODE § 1290 (West 1989). 
23 See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11352 (West 1991 & Supp. 1993) 
(criminal violation for sale of controlled substances). 
24 PARKMAN, supra note 3, at 14. 
25 ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY 527 (1984). 
26 ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-65-310(b) (Michie 1987 & Supp. 1993). 
27 ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-14-105 (Michie Supp. 1993). 
28 ROBERT T. KIMBROUGH, SUMMARY OF AMERICAN LAW 92-93 (1974). 
29 PARKMAN, supra note 3, at 112. 
30 KIMBROUGH, supra note 28, at 196-197. 
31 This literature is summarized in RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF 
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A. Remedies for Breach of a Contract 
While damages are the usual remedy for the breach of a 
contract, they are not the only remedy, nor is there only one 
method for estimating damages. Richard Posner identifies sev-
en remedies for the breach of a contract: the promisee's reli-
ance loss, the expectation loss, liquidated damages, consequen-
tial damages, restitution, specific performance, and a money 
penalty specified in the contract or other punitive damages.32 
The two remedies that have been available in marriage dissolu-
tion cases have been liquidated damages and specific perfor-
mance.33 The desirability of these remedies for a contractual 
breach varies with the nature of the contract. 
1. Damages 
Damages are the usual remedy for the breach of a contract 
and are based on compensating the non-breaching party for his 
loss.34 It is not the policy of the law to compel the perfor-
mance of contracts but only to require each party to choose 
between performing and compensating the other party for any 
injury resulting from a failure to perform.35 A party to a con-
tract who is injured by its breach is entitled to compensation 
for the injury sustained and is entitled to be placed, to the 
extent this can be done by money, in the same financial posi-
tion he would have occupied if the contract had been per-
formed. 36 The usual standards for damages are the expected 
gain or the loss incurred due to reliance. 37 In marriage disso-
lution cases, the liquidated damages consist of the financial 
and custodial arrangements required by law or specified by the 
parties in pre-marital or post-marital contracts. 
LAW 117-32 (4th ed. 1992). 
32 !d. at 117. 
33 PARKMAN, supra note 3, at 64. 
34 For a more detailed discussion of damages, see generally COMMERCIAL 
DAMAGES (Charles L. Knapp ed., 1988). 
35 Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 462 
(1897). 
36 KIMBROUGH, supra note 28, at 199-202. 
37 FARNSWORTH, supra note 21, at 839-40. 
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2. Specific performance 
Specific performance is the other remedy that has been 
available in marriage dissolution cases. With the fault-based 
grounds for divorce, innocent spouses had a right to specific 
performance of the agreement to remain married during the 
joint lives of the parties. However, under contract law, specific 
performance will only be ordered when damages are not an 
adequate remedy, such as when damages are difficult or impos-
sible to measure because of the lack of good substitutes for the 
performance promised by the breaching party. This remedy 
requires the breaching party to perform the contract or face 
contempt of court. Still, specific performance is a right rather 
than a requirement, because the party who has a right to spe-
cific performance can waive that right.38 The usual incentive 
for waiving the right is compensation. 
The most common use of specific performance occurs when 
the subject of the contract is unique, such as real estate trans-
actions.39 However, it also can be used in suits for personal 
property when the property is unique.40 While personal servic-
es are often unique, courts have been less willing to apply spe-
cific performance to contracts for personal servicesY Never-
theless, when specific performance has been applied to personal 
service contracts, courts have issued an injunction to stop the 
person from providing the service elsewhere rather than per-
forming the contracted service.42 
B. Efficient Remedies 
Contract remedies tend to create incentives for parties to 
make efficient decisions --the benefits exceed the costs-- that 
increase social welfare.43 When two parties contract, it is rea-
sonable to assume that both expect to be better off due to the 
contracted transaction. However, contracts that involve future 
activities can be subject to unforeseen changes. These unfore-
seen circumstances present the parties with the option of either 
performing the contract or paying damages. If the seller's costs 
38 PARKMAN, supra note 3, at 127. 
39 FARNSWORTH, supra note 21, at 829-30. 
40 ld. at 830-31. 
41 ld. at 835-36. 
42 ld. at 836. 
43 POSNER, supra note 31, at 118. 
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rise so that the buyer can acquire the contracted goods from 
another source at a lower price than the seller's costs, society is 
better off if the buyer buys from the alternate source. However, 
the law requires the seller to compensate the buyer for the 
difference between the contract price and the price actually 
paid.44 Meanwhile, the supplier has avoided incurring the 
higher costs of production. 
On the other hand, the use of specific performance as the 
remedy for the breach of a contract for unique goods is also 
based on a desire for efficient outcomes.45 When a breach is 
worth more to the breaching party than performance to the 
victim, specific performance creates incentives for the parties to 
reach a settlement that leaves them better off. Specific perfor-
mance forces the parties to identify their costs and benefits 
from not performing.46 The costs associated with nonperfor-
mance when the good is unique are the value of the good to the 
buyer and the expense of finding an alternative.47 Given the 
uniqueness of the particular good, these costs usually cannot be 
estimated by anyone other than the parties who have incen-
tives to make that calculation to determine a possible basis for 
a negotiated settlement.48 Specific performance does have the 
disadvantage that it can increase the costs of settlement nego-
tiations. These negotiations are a deadweight loss since the 
costs incurred by one party do not confer benefits on the other. 
William Bishop noted that the choice of a remedy often 
turns on a trade-off between the potential cost of "excessive 
breaches" when damages are awarded and of "excessive perfor-
mance" when specific performance is awarded.49 Because of 
the legal requirement that damages must be proven and not 
speculative, the actual damages resulting from a breach can be 
underestimated. If the damages are under estimated, individu-
als could be induced to breach contracts when the costs of the 
breaches exceed the benefits, i.e., excessive breaches. Alterna-
tively, with specific performance one party can demand the 
44 CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 20, at 619. 
45 See William Bishop, The Choice of Remedy for Breach of Contract, 14 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 299 (1985); Anthony T. Kronman, Specific Performance, 45 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 351, 365 (1978); Alan Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance, 89 YALE 
L.J. 271, 291-92 (1979). 
46 PARKMAN, supra note 3, at 126-27. 
47 !d. at 126. 
48 !d. at 126-27. 
49 Bishop, supra note 45, at 299-300. 
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performance of the contract either due to spite or to an incor-
rect estimate of the outcome of negotiations when the net bene-
fits are negative, i.e., excessive performance. With either reme-
dy, the parties can avoid the legal outcomes by negotiating 
their settlements. The preferred rules will be the ones that are 
more likely to produce efficient outcomes with damages pre-
ferred for normal transactions and specific performance when 
the subject of a contract is unique. 
IV. REMEDIES FOR BREACH OF THE MARRIAGE AGREEMENT 
Because the decision to dissolve a marriage involves costs 
and benefits, social welfare is improved when the remedies 
encourage divorce only when the net benefits are positive.50 
The fault-based grounds for divorce provided the spouses with 
a legal right to specific performance of the marriage agreement, 
especially the right to certain standards of conduct and a con-
tinuation of the marriage. If a spouse breached the agreement 
by adultery, cruelty or desertion, the innocent party could sue 
for divorce. The spouse who committed the breach could not 
use that act to initiate a divorce. If a spouse initiated a divorce 
based on the fault grounds and relied on the courts to decide 
the financial and custodial arrangements, the remedy was 
liquidated damages based on the reliance interest of the inno-
cent spouse.51 The actual divorce arrangements based on spe-
cific performance, however, were often more generous to the di-
vorced spouse based on private agreements that were ratified 
by the courts, rather than being independent determinations by 
them. 
With the introduction of no-fault divorce, however, the 
importance of private arrangements changed dramatically. In 
most states, a spouse could get a divorce without the agree-
ment of his or her spouse under the new no-fault laws. In con-
trast to the situation under the fault based grounds, the finan-
cial and custodial arrangements of no-fault based divorce were 
more likely to be based on legal standards. It was unlikely that 
negotiated settlements would differ dramatically from what the 
parties could expect from litigation. Because of the increase in 
employment and marriage opportunities for divorced women, 
flO PARKMAN, supra note ::l, at 128. 
fi1 Margaret F. Brinig & June Carbone, The Reliance Interest in Marriage 
and Divorce, 62 TUL. L. REV. Rfifi, 870-82 (1988). 
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the courts under the reliance interest generally provided more 
limited awards for divorced women. 52 Without any grounds for 
divorce, the people who did not want a divorce were in a much 
weaker position to negotiate settlements which substantially 
improved the award they could expect from litigation. At di-
vorce, a woman could expect to receive a property settlement 
that returned her separate property and gave her approximate-
ly half the tangible property acquired during the marriage, 
some rehabilitative support, and child support until the chil-
dren became adults. These arrangements are similar to damag-
es under contract law. 
The damage remedy for a contract breach will produce 
excessive and inefficient breaches when the damages are less 
than the loss experienced by the non-breaching party. 53 If the 
divorcing spouse is confronted with costs that are less than 
those of all affected parties, then the probability increases that 
a divorce will occur when the net benefits to the divorcing 
spouse are negative. Under the Coase Theorem, the divorce 
would not occur when the costs and benefits consist of private 
goods that can be converted to common units, i.e., dollars, and 
transaction costs are zero.54 Under those circumstances, if the 
costs of a choice exceeded the benefits, the parties have an 
incentive to negotiate an outcome that rejects that choice. This 
efficient outcome may not occur, however, because the benefits 
of marriage and the costs of divorce may be public goods, val-
ued in heterogeneous units, and the transaction costs associat-
ed with divorce can be substantial.55 
The loss experienced by the divorced spouse, especially one 
who increased her specialization in household production dur-
ing marriage, is often underestimated because the impact of 
decisions during marriage on her income earning capacity, 
human capital, is usually ignored in the financial arrange-
ments at divorce. At marriage, individuals have already ac-
52 Some have argued that no-fault divorce was interpreted by the courts as 
recognizing the equality of men and women. Therefore, it was no longer necessary 
to provide substantial support to women after divorce. See WEITZMAN, supra note 
4, at 857. 
58 PARKMAN, supra note a, at 127. 
54 See generally R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Costs, a J.L. & EcoN. 1 
(1960). 
55 See Martin Zelder, Inefficient Dissolutions as a Consequence of Public 
Goods: The Case of No-Fault Divorce, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 508 (199::1); Douglas W. 
Allen, Comment, Marriage and Divorce, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 679 (1992). 
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quired some separate property. For many people, their most 
valuable asset is their human capital. The value of this human 
capital is the discounted value of earnings that reasonably can 
be expected in the future net of any future investments. During 
marriage, human capital can either increase or decrease. If 
human capital increases, marital property is created. Alterna-
tively, if a spouse's human capital decreases during marriage 
due to decisions by the spouses, that loss is similar to a contri-
bution of separate property to the marriage. Often a couple 
decides that the family will benefit if one spouse, usually the 
wife, limits her career to assume a primary role as a housewife 
and mother. At divorce, this person's human capital is worth 
less than if she had not limited her career. Typically, legal 
standards for divorce settlements do not consider this loss in 
any systematic way. 
Without the limited protection provided by the fault 
grounds for divorce, many people who increased their special-
ization during marriage, especially as housewives and mothers, 
are worse off under no-fault divorce if their marriage is dis-
solved. Even those women who remain married may seek addi-
tional employment and education during marriage as insurance 
against their costs if they are divorced. If employment and 
education confer only limited benefits on their family, the other 
family members may not assume many of the chores that the 
women have traditionally provided at home.56 Finally, all the 
family members may be worse off because of the incentives 
created for married women to pursue additional employment 
and education during marriage.57 Based on their benefits and 
costs, many married women have incentives to pursue employ-
ment and education during marriage even when the net bene-
fits to their family are negative. This additional employment 
and education may not provide compensating benefits for the 
family, but it does provide insurance for the married woman if 
the marriage is dissolved. 
56 This can often happen later in marriage because of the asymmetry of the 
contributions of the spouses. See Cohen, supra note 10, at 285-87. A number of 
authors have noted that the total hours worked by married women both at home 
and at a job have increased over the last few decades at the same time that the 
hours worked by married men have declined. See VICTOR R. FuCHS, WOMEN'S 
QUEST FOR ECONOMIC EQUAUTY 77-78 (1988); BETH ANNE SHELTON, WOMEN, MEN 
AND TIME 112 (1992). 
57 Allen M. Parkman, Unilateral Divorce and the Labor Force Participation 
Rate of Married Women, Revisited, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 671 (1992). 
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A more accurate measurement of the costs that result from 
divorce, including consideration of human capital, would in-
crease social welfare. The incorporation of human capital into 
the property considered at divorce, however, would still not 
recognize the subjective costs due to a divorce. Although the 
knowledge that the divorcing spouse no longer wants to live 
with the divorced spouse might reduce that person's attraction 
to the divorcing spouse, there is still a potential loss to that 
person due to the desire for a continuing relationship with that 
person. 
Another important source of costs for the divorced spouse 
is search.58 Both parties incurred search costs to identify each 
other initially. Now, either one spouse has decided that he or 
she has already found a person that he or she prefers to the 
current spouse or is willing to incur additional costs searching 
for a better spouse or situation. The divorced spouse must in-
voluntarily incur the cost of searching for another mate or 
living situation. Often, this cost can be very high. 
Finally, the divorce may be costly to the children.59 The 
quality of life can deteriorate for children shared by two par-
ents-living separately-compared to the conditions still possi-
ble when living with both parents. If divorce were more diffi-
cult to obtain, some parents probably could make their mar-
riage work and, thereby, provide benefits to their children. The 
parent, usually the mother, who expects custody of the children 
after divorce, is more likely to recognize the costs that the 
children incur because they will be less happy when they live 
only with her. These relationship, search and children's costs 
are difficult to calculate and, therefore, are not included in 
awards at divorce. As a result, the awards at divorce tend to 
underestimate the costs of divorce. When the costs of divorce 
are underestimated, the probability increases that a divorce 
will occur when the net benefits are negative. These divorces 
reduce social welfare. 
58 Marriage is the result of a search process during which the parties weigh 
the benefits and the costs of additional search. See BECKER, supra note 14. 
59 Unfortunately, little is known about the effect of divorce on children. See 
generally Gary S. Becker & Kevin M. Murphy, The Family and the State, 31 J.L. 
& ECON. 1 (1988). However, generally, children prefer an unhappy marriage to a 
divorce. See JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN & JOAN B. KELLY, SURVIVING THE BREAKUP 
(1980). 
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V. A MARRIAGE CODE 
Since most marriages benefit from increased investments 
in specialization by the spouses, making marriage a long-term 
arrangement may be necessary to protect these investments.60 
A Marriage Code similar to the Uniform Commercial Code 
could be drafted that would specify the terms of the marriage 
contract, subject to any modifications by the parties. The pre-
sumed duration of marriage would be the joint lives of the 
parties with the usual remedy being specific performance. The 
recognition of the subjective costs of divorce ignored under 
current divorce laws advocates specific performance as the pre-
ferred remedy for the breach of the marriage agreement. If the 
benefits of the dissolution exceed the costs, social welfare would 
be improved by permitting the couple to negotiate a dissolution 
of the marriage. The party who did not initiate the divorce may 
no longer feel strongly attracted to her spouse. She can find a 
situation just as appealing as the current marriage with a 
limited amount of effort and any children would not be ad-
versely affected by a divorce. She might, therefore, be willing to 
reach a divorce agreement at a small cost to the party who 
wanted the divorce. Social welfare would be improved by per-
mitting the divorce. Alternatively, she might still be strongly 
attracted to her spouse, feel that only a long and costly search 
would find another comparable situation and that the children 
would suffer compared to the quality of life possible if the par-
ents stay together. Under those circumstances, she might ask 
for a level of compensation that the other spouse is unwilling to 
pay. In other words, the party who wants the divorce does not 
value the dissolution as much as the wife values the continua-
tion of the marriage. Then, social welfare is improved by con-
tinuing the marriage. 
The definition of property should be expanded in the Code 
to include all the assets owned by the parties including their 
human capital. At divorce, separate property would be returned 
to the parties and marital property would be divided equally 
between them. To protect any children, the Code should specify 
unmodifiable support standards that include any income reduc-
tion incurred by the custodial parent due to custody. With a 
60 The gains from a division of labor and specialization during marriage are 
discussed in BECKEH, supra note 14. 
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more accurate definition of property and child support, alimony 
could be limited or eliminated. With the exception of the child 
support standards, the other provisions of the Code could be 
modified by the parties. 
Mutual consent divorce gives substantial power to spouses 
who do not want a divorce. To limit abuse of this power, it may 
be attractive to permit no-fault divorce when the potential costs 
of divorce are likely to be low, as they tend to be early in a 
marriage and when there are no children. Therefore, no-fault 
divorce might be permitted during the first year of marriage or 
until the wife becomes pregnant, whichever comes first. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The introduction of no-fault divorce has resulted in a dete-
rioration in the financial condition of many divorced women 
and their children and a reduction in the quality of family life. 
This outcome is due to the financial arrangements under no-
fault divorce tending to underestimate the costs of divorce, 
thereby, producing inefficient outcomes. This situation could be 
improved by viewing marriage as a contract and recognizing 
that a contractual remedy can improve social welfare. The 
current marriage contract in most states is terminable at will 
subject to financial and custodial arrangements similar to dam-
ages. Because many marriages benefit from investments by 
spouses that require long-term protection, the presumption 
should be that marriage is for the joint lives of the parties. The 
remedy for the breach of the marriage contract should be spe-
cific performance. These changes will increase the likelihood 
that the parties will divorce only when the benefits exceed the 
costs. 
